Purdue University

Purdue e-Pubs
Department of Computer Science Technical
Reports

Department of Computer Science

1974

Selectively Defined Subsystems
Dorothy E. Denning
Peter J. Denning
G. Scott Graham

Report Number:
74-124

Denning, Dorothy E.; Denning, Peter J.; and Graham, G. Scott, "Selectively Defined Subsystems" (1974).
Department of Computer Science Technical Reports. Paper 75.
https://docs.lib.purdue.edu/cstech/75

This document has been made available through Purdue e-Pubs, a service of the Purdue University Libraries.
Please contact epubs@purdue.edu for additional information.

"

SELECTIVELY CONF1NETl SUBSYSTEMS
Dorothy E. Denning
Peter J. Denning
G. Scott Graham*
Computer Sciences Department
Purdue University
West Lafayette. Indiana 47907

CSD-TR 124

*Department of Computer Science, University,of Toronto,· Toronto, Ontario
MSS 11\7, Canada

..

"

---- ---- ---- ---- ---- 1

SELECTIVELY CONFINED SUBSYSTEMS

-

"1£ RIEN INSCRIR E :

I

!

I

I
,,

,
I

II
D~h.. t
1~lCIe

I~

Dorot hy E. Denni ng
Peter J. Denni ng
G. SCott Graham
Purdu e

Abstr act:

Unive rsity

The imple menta tion of progra mming system s

that canno t leak confi denti al inform ation Is exami ned.
Unles s sever e restr ictio ns are place d on their form,
progra ms of such system s canno t even be permi tted
to
outpu t appar ently nonco nflde ntial inform ation unles s
they have been prove d error -free .

ell

pcur

'Introd uction

li!'1: ~: I~

leulem~nt

Satisf actory soluti ons

are noW known for a variet y of protec tion problem s rangin
g
'from contro lled access [0 program s and data to mechan
isms for debugg ing subsystem s. Howev
er. a problem stlll requir ing invest igatio n 1s the confin

ement
·proble m; LSDJPson define s it as the problem of const.
aining a "servi ce proces s" so
'that it csnnot leak any inform ation about its "custo
mer proces ses" [l}. He out:lines a soluti on to the problem , which in eaaenc e
constr ains the servic e proces s
,from retain ing any inform ation after it ceases to
'opera te on behalf of a custo~er proces s, but it may share inform
ation with anothe r proces 8 88 long 88 the
·other proces a is simila rly confin ed, or else truste
d by both the custom er nnd the
server . We shall refer to his as the approa ch of
total confin ement.
Our purpos e here is invest igatin g nn approa ch to the
confin ement problem baaed on
select ive rather than total confin ement. A proces
s or subsys tem of proces sea 1s
,regsrd ed as being select ively confin ed if it is free
to retain or share infotllU l.-tion which is not confid ential with respec t to a custom
er proces s, but not information which is; moreov er, a custom er may declas sify
previo usly confid ential informat ion for retent ion by the servic e. For exa~pl
e, a select ively confin ed
'income tax compu ting servic e may be allowe d to retain
addres s and billin g information on its usc by custom ers, but not inform ation
on its custom ers' income S.
This type of problem has been referre d to 8S the coope
ration betwee n mutua lly
sUBpic ious subsys tems, one of which i6 "l1lelll oryless
" (2].

We begin by propos ing iJ mechan ism which "obvio usly"
provid es select ive confin ehowev er, closer inspec tion reveal s an import ant limita
tion in the mechan ism.
We sr-e no easy vay ~o resolv e the lImita tion, and
we arc led to the conclu sion
that, in the curren t stat€' of the art, no soluti on
to the confin ement proble m,
short of total· confin ement, is viabJ.e .

m~nt;
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General Properties of a Confinement Mechanism
,Consider a computing system with processes PO •.••• Pn snd data segmen~B N1 ••••• N •
lnterprocess communication 1s handled by message sending primitives,
such m
88 .end messlIge, ~ message, send .w..!l.. and.B.U~' The segments may be
regarded us logical or physical data structures corresponding to flIes, memory
.units. registers, etc. Bnrl are partitioned into t.wo classes: local and global
'segmenta, A segment is ~ (or private) if it ia accessible to exactly one
proctl!lls; otherwise it 18 global (or shared). Note that two processes with access

,to the .ame global
,vi.
N •
1

segment N may be able
i

to

communicate by transmitting data

s~rvice process which is to operate for
P'e in selectively confined mode. Let C denote data considered confidential by
NE RIEN IN3CRII1i: : P ; as will be discussed below, the size of C can grow because any data P s (or a
p~ocess c~lled by P ) derives from C will be added to C, and it can ahrink in
case Pc rele,J.6es itSft"om confidential status (declassifies it). Listed below are
.Ix general properties for 3 mechaniam of selective confinement; though they may
seem restrictive, they constitute a minimal set of constraints under which P and
c
'
Pa ~re likely to agree to operate, given their mutual suspicions.

'Let Pc denote 8 customer process and P e a

A central concept belo~ is called engagement. In general. a process P ia aaid
j
;to be engaged bl' its cal let" Pi' whenever Pi sends confidential dat:e t:o Pj. How,ever, Pi will not be permitted by the system to engage Pj. unless Pj hss previously agreed to operate under the rules of selective confinement. and has met all
requirements necessary for this mode of operation. We postulate a Boolesn syst:em
function ceJt.ti.6.ied(j) which returns true i f and only i f Pj is certified to have
tt~l" ; {,~
met the requirements for selectively confined operation. Then Pi may engsge P j
la I~T~ ::' ..' . i f and only i f ceJt.ti.6-Led(j), and only i f P j is not already engaged.
ltulcm';'ll

,In the following, assume that PO,P l .P2 •••. denotes a system of processes such
tbat Po • Pc is the customer, PI is the aervice p s • Pi for i ~ 1 are processes
which can be employed by PI..., and ceJt.t.i.6.ie.d(1) for i ~ O.
In the sequence. i <
implies that Pi was called earlier than Pj. A si~gle Bet of confidential data
initially proVided by PO. 1s assumed throughout.

J

C'I

1.

Mutual Exclusion (one custOmer at a time). Pj ia engaged by Pi as soon aa Pi
lends Pj a message containing data from the
confidential set C. prOViding
that P j is not already engaged. While Pj is engaged. it may receive confidential
data only from 1ts caller, or any processes it engageS.

I

-2.

Closure. If Pi pet"for1lls an operation using any data from C, the result of
that operation is added to C: Any information derived from confidential data 15
itself confidential.
(Pt"ecisely stated, if any of xl •••••
are in C. then the
~esult f(x1 ••.• x ) of oper<ltion f 1s added to C.)
n

Xn

3.
Non-Leakage. Pi may place an element of C in a segment N only i f N 1s local
,to ·Pi (local segments are inaccessible to other proceases).

II

4. Transitivity. If Pi sends a message to Pj (11"0) containing data from C, then'
Pj becomes engaged by Pi. Horeover, Pi may not disengage itself from its caller
until Pj disengages itsel f from Pi. In other words, all processes which eventually receive data from PO's set C become engaged (effectiv~ly by PO) and must
be confined.

s.

Dcclnssificntinn. Data may be declassified (removed from c) only by PO. on
receipt of a meS9~gc from P1 requesting declassification of data contained in the
message. III genC!ral. if P j (j~l) .....ants dat:a declassified, it must request SO
from its caller Pi (i<j); this 1s repC!ated by a choin of messages until the original customer Po is consult~d.

--.!

,,
'I

I
I

-4.

Transitivity. The eogagement operation must verify that 1f Pi .ttempt~ to
engage Pj. then DJ - (O,undefined) and ~~6~6£ed(j). If this 1s true. then
Dj :. (1,1), and
Is added to the engngement list Li of Its engagor Pi"

5.

Dccla~,;!ic~~~.

Postulate a system operation ~ete~e(x) for setting the
tag of x to 0 vithouc changing the value of x. This operation

cnnfidentj~'ity

could be pf'dormcd only by the process (in this case PO) which set the taB in the
first plac~; in terms of our ~~del. ~eied4e(x) cannot be executed by any engaged
process. If Pj 1s eng~gcJ. it can obtain the release of x only by sending a

message to its engagor Pi (i<j), if l~O. Pi would forward the message to its
engagor, ~~d so on unt!l Po wa~ contacted. The declassified x would be trans-

.mdeted back to

fj by a

reverse chain of messages.

D1sengag~ment. PJ ,,'ollid request disengagemene by a system function ,U.•!IIl.n...
This function ~ould be allowable only if ehe engagement list Lj is null,
,-,heu:"pcn j t 0.',:)111<..1 h,::',~ tht <::~h:":L::; vf a) removing j from the engagement list Li.
where Dj ~ U,i), then b) setcing Dj to (O,undefined), and c) purging from Pj
all elemcu:s of C - i.e., 6ny data whose confidentiality tag is set.

6.

gage.

UDfoTtunatl~ly, the

mechill1L;m we have specified does not prevent leakage of confidcntb] datil! Althougl1 <J r:onfincd process Pj cannot directly leak data that is
fl<lggcd C')l;[ldclllo.,d, tl,er" i,; nothing in our mechanism to prevent it from leaking non--cr'llfitlcntial data chat 1S equal in value to confidential data. For example. if :-tEG and N is a global segment, then the value of X can be leaked by
executing rhe stateroent
..[6 X - y then wlLUe. y .in;t;o N.
LamPSOIL discusses uther subtle forms of leakage, sUl;h as leakage on "covert
chann"ls" (e.g., by cleveriy altering the system load) in [1].
,
In ollr effon to find a solution to this problem, we made the following observation: tJany very sdbtl2 e:-: ... mples of leakage can be constructed by embedding
statements communicating non-confIdential variables in program segments condi(;10n(,,1 on Booleen C,"StS on <.:onfidential data. A solution <'0 the problem is then
briefly .:;L.;lted .:IS follo~;5; Let b be a Boolean expression and A an action conditioned on b. By the closure rule, if b contains an operand XEG, then bEG.
The probl£:].; it; th",n solved by illhibiting all communicacion by an engaged P
j
~hi]e Pj is executing A if b is confidential.
Hence Pj would not be allowed LO
~rite lllto ,1 glob<JI scgmcnl or ·issue spurious messages to another process while
~t "'l,:' ... c:U"b on tc1niidentloll dilta.
160lat1ng the action A, however, in~olve5 a complex flow analysis of the code
bCCHUS" oj ttn' po~~ihi.lit~· of 51·.!~ effects. Consider, for example, the followIng
otntccll'ntl<. ~'I1f'r,~ >: ~.~ ronfld"fll'1iJ] and N is a global segment:
,~ X ..

.i..6

0 111('11 Y;-Oj
y ~ 0 .thul W!LUe Z

.i..nto N.
Ilc'.e ~be <l("tlr 01 ',,",,"l:
(1110 ;.;" 1s inclirectly conditioned on the confidential
!l<;,}]e;,"l "}........
:' .. ",,:.1;'1:: :.1,1:... involves a flow analysis that takes into account
<':011uol fl,~,",. Such a flow analysis would probably have to
code (for efficiency as well as practicality considcrati"r. c ' ,1'1'! rh" '·0lT.pj~l·'- '.'{luld 1', ... ",(' to tlelimit the body of the actions in the
lQ'-l::h"l" ,.(>.'
I:'
r:v,,]';;"ng;\ ..:onfidential Boolean, the hardware (With the
pos!'~,Llc ~" ':
" . t ...·,'rc' ;·,uL.i1cS) 1s th"n responsible for insuring that all
C(l"l~.\."ir'l'
' l ' \ · , \0'
I :~;·;,cu ~hile executing instructions within the body
of th.~ a!':~., ltic{',1 art!{,n.
data

l.'l'~'

bE. ~1l'TI('

:;,

,

oJ"

... ·ll

'1'1 • ,n

,l~

1\'<'

',0\....-"

A mor., .,t[l..><..tlV,· "oluthJll to the problem involves the use of type checking and
t:DTllpll(·-l!.
rtlficaLlon, Here the pror,rllmrner declares all vari<lbles to be
L·il· I (·,- ,,..r,
.,..
'" \.!.,ntlilJ . • lll: compiier uses this information to__

,(
,,

;'

•
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Ot!enaa8em~ (and Non-R etentio n).
When Pi diseng ages from its caller Pi
~ it 1s Qot permit ted to retain any data In C; to
enforc e this. the system

;,,:U.l pL\{a,e from Pj

_ 4.at~e

a.ll remain ing elemen ts of C ss part of the diseng

(If P refuse s to agree to this, the Mutual Exclus ion ruleageme nt opJ
will guarttLe t.Qtsl isolat ion of P fr.olll the rest of the sya,tem
.)

!Q~~!o ~.

j

;Tb.e above rules in fact specif y the operat ion of
a select ively confin ed system of
'PrQce sses. with entry proces s PI' The system 1s
the set of all select ively conif1~ed

proces ses formed by taking the closur e of the transi tivity
relatio

n aug',luted by :ule 5 (i.e., it 1s the set of all select
ively confin ed proces ses that
=ay become engage d data either direct ly or indire
ctly by PO). The elemen ts of
the c.onfid ent.ial ·dat.a C are distrib uted among the
proces ses of the system PO.Pl.
PZ.· ••• The mut.ual exclus ion rule ensure s that. any
confid ent.ial data in an en-aaged pr9ces s Pi (i>O) 15 a member of the one aet
C. The closur e rule enaure a
IE RIEN INSCRm :::: t.hat. any data derive d in any Pi 1s
added to C. The nonlea ksge rule keeps element.s of C local to each Pi. The transi tivit.y rule
provid es that each Pi is
confin ed. or commu nicates only with other confin ed
proces ses. The de"cl.ass if.icat ion rule permit s any proces s Pi to get
data remove d from C. but only
vith t.he explic it pet'"mi ssion of PO. Finall y. the
diseng ageme nt rule guaran tees
that no elemen t. of C remain s access ible to Pi when
it diseng ages itself from its
:calle r.
l:arplem entat ion
Let PO.PI. P2 •..• denote a system of select ively confin
ed proces ses with custom er
and server Pl. Assoc iate with each proces s Pi is
an engage ment list. Lt. c.onD~lHJl d~ .......:tal ning indice s of all proces ses direct
ly engage d by Pii initia lly Li is null.
tCHle POU" ,Msoc iate with each proces s Pj an engage
ment descri ptor Dj .. (e.i). in whic.h at a
Iii Hr~ p~!:,e !partic ular time
W'ulemenl
I implie s P j is engage d by Pi' and
~
e - 0 1mpI1e s P j is not engage d and i is undefi ned.
Assoc iate with each data ele~ent a specia l bit,
called the confid ential ity tag •
• et to 1 if and only if that elemen t is in C; this
tsg can be set to 1 for a
datum x by an unenga ged proces s, using s system operat
ion 6etlag (x). Then any
datum referen ced by ?1 i9 consid ered confid ential
if snd only if it 10 90
flagge d. This could De implem ented trivia lly in
a tagged archit ecture [3].

Po

Ie ..

3. Non-Le akage. To impl~men[ the non-le akage rule
we simply raise an error
condit iOn if Pj attC~pt9 to [ran~fcr a tagged datum
to s global segmen t. ThiS
can be hnndle d by ,; superv isor I/O roulin. :, (if the
global segmen t is a file. say)
or by hardwa re, In the cose of lllBged archit ecture
and II scgrcen ted virtua l
'
IIC111ory. Thl! effect of rllisin g lhe- error l.:ondi tion
mily reault in the autom atic
purg1n Z of all confid antL.ll d.:lt;) from Pj'!l QICmory
.

J
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determine which expressions have confidential results. By simple control
flow analysis of III program, the compiler examines all statement. 1n the
body of each action conditioned on III confldent1al Boolean.: it dlaal.lows
in them any output statements and gives type errors if nonconfldent.lal

variables are assigned confidential results.
again the program segment

'L

.i6
.i6

For example, conaldar

then y:"o;
then wJt..i.te z -i.n.:to N;
th X declared to be confidential, and Y declared to be non-confidential.
X .. 0
Y .. 0

Since

.!the

exp't'ession "X-O" is then known to be c.onfidential. the compiler would detect
D~uut~~_~e error with respect to Y, and the program would not be certified.
Itxle po!.:,

la lire

pt·~~

leulement

This solution ia more at.tractive for tva reasODS: the flov analysis is simple,
and it allows most of the problem to be solved at compile-time. The only check

that must be performed dynamically verifies that the actual parameters (or inputs
the program) do not e~ceed the declared confidentiality of the formal paraFeters.

to
I

Closer scrutiny, however. reveals that the problem is ~ not solved I For
example, consider the follOWing sequence of statements, where X is declared confidential, I is declared non-confidential. and N is a global segment:
1;-0: SUM:-O;

"'PeAt
SUM: - SUM + X;.
1:-1

+ 1;

WltUe r .into N
6011.evVl.
ince the iteration does not appear to be conditioned on X. the compiler would
F.e:rtifY this program segment. Uo..... suppose the program executes, but after 10
~terations SUM overflows - i.e., the value of SUM exceeds M4X, the largest number
~torable in a register. 'Since the value of 10 has been put in a global segment,
~other process can subsequently retrie~e it Bnd esttmate X fro~ MAX/Io.
;rhe reason for this problem is that the Boolean expression "SUM o'verflows" implicitly controls the loop, although it Is not explicitly stated. If the pro-irammer had instead written
,
IlnO;SUM:-O
AepeAt
SUM: -SUM + X:
1:"'1 + Ii
W1!.Ue I .into N
until SUM overflows
then the compiler would have detected the type error with respect to 1 and not
ceTtified' the Frogram.
The preceding problem arises with all dynamic error conditions, including even
'Boltware checks on array bounds. This is because all such error conditions
'represent Boo18ans that cannot be analyzed at compile-time. 14e are thus led to
our final CC'dcluslon: the program must contatn no errors'l The compiler can
.afely certify 8 program for confinement if and only if it can prove the program
,to be correct. This impliea that the compiler must. perform range checking as
veIl &11 type checking. Hence, the programmer must specify a range of values for
.ach input parameter. At execution time, the system must also verify that the
¥4lullS of the actual paramaters fall within the range of the formal parameters.

I

'

Another possible approach is to permit a prosram to execute without certification
~.yond the type chocking mentioned earlier.
Then if an error should result
~urin8 executiOn of the program, the owner of the confidential data would hsve
~he opportunity to sue for breach of confidentiality.
In order to prove whether
~~:~~.t. the program had leaked data, £\ trace of the confinad program' S ~,~:.~~~_t_inB
NE. RIEN I;":SCRlRf.:
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;behav ior is requir ed, which tr~ce would autom aticall y
be transm itted to the
Icustom er if the servic e genera ted an error. The court
must then be able to ex-amine this trace as well as the program code. In the
long run, it would be
:chesp er for servic eS to provid e program s whose correc
tness can be verifi ed.
The forego ing discus sion has shown that enforc ement of
the propoB ed Non-Le akage
Rule (an engage d proces s may output only nonco nfiden tial
data) is consid erably
jmore diffic ult than super ficial consid eratio n might lead
one to believ e. In the
~preae nt stste of the art, the only
feasib le Non-Le akage Rule is: An engage d pro~ce88 may not under any circum stance s write jnto
a global segmen t or commu nicate
;vith a noneng aged proces s, and all data it has writte
n into local segmen ts
-excep t for declas sified clata - must be purged on diseng
ageme nt if all' error has
occurr ed anywhe re in the confin ed system . Under this
rule the mechan ism we have
propos ed is an implem entatio n of Lamps on's totally confin
ed system , with the
NE RIEN INSCRlR E: follow
ing except ions: Data declas sified by the custom er may
be retain ed in the
_local segmen ts of a proces s after diseng ageme nt, and
other non-c onfide ntial data
be retain ed if no errora have occurr ed.
,:may.. _--

Concl usion s
The mecha nism of iselec tive confin ement descr ibed in this
guish es betwe en two class es of data used by a subsy stem, paper disti nconfi denti al
and nonco nfide ntial. Conf ident ial data canno t be retain
ed in any private subsy stem segme nt p nor may it be copied . by the subsy
stem into any
globa l seqme nt, unlea s decla ssifie d by the custa ner.
One of our conclusi ons 1s that a confi ned subsy stem of the type descr
ibed here canno t
be permi tted to outpu t any data, even that tagge d
nonco nfide ntial, \D'lles s
it can be certi fied as error -free . In our prese nt resea
rch, we are
exami ning possi ble progra mming restr ictio ns accor ding
to which nonle akage
of confi denti al data can b~ guara nteed witho ut the requlr
ernert t of a

progra m corre ctnes s proof .

It is inter estin g to notc!! that Fento n has recen tly repor
ted on a close ly
relat ed proble m, mernoryle8B subsy stems [8]. To provi
de a conte xt withi n
which he can prove rigor ously hi8 resul ts, Fento n poses
the proble m on
an abstr act autom aton (a l"l1.naky mach ine). In this conte
xt, he showe d
how to guara ntee confinem~nt of confi denti al data when
the ffi8ch 1ne's
regis ter$ have b~an partit ioned ~ t l y into two
sets -- those for
confld entU! il de:ta, and tho,ge for nonco nfide ntial. His
imple menta tion
suita bly restr icts the progra ms for the machi ne to deal
with the confiden tial Boole an proble m. His proof demo nstrat es the
impo ssibil ity
of copyi ng inform ation from the confi denti al to the nonco
nfide ntial
regis ters. Fento n al130 consi ders varia ble confi denti
ality class es. He
shows t~t if there exiet s a regis ter whose confi denti
ality can be
chang ed (viz. , from non...~n.f1dentlal to confi denti al),
it i. possi ble
to const ruct 8 progra m '\:1hich will be able to leak Jriva
te inform ation .
ThiB latte r resul t is a1rnil ar in natur e to oura, in that
proof of
nonle akaqe for varia ble confi denti ality claBs machi nes
is tantam ount
to a progra m corre ctneo s proof .
Ackno wledg ement . We ere grate ful to R. Stock ton Gaine
s and H. O.
Sehwetman for helpf ul insig ht. whllo 11"0po<1ng thil work.
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